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HOKE v. NETHERLAND
92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Ronald Lee Hoke, Sr. was convicted in 1986 of capital murder in the
robbery, rape and abduction of Virginia Stell. Stell and Hoke were seen
together at the European Restaurant in Petersburg, Virginia, in early
October 1985, and Stell's nude body was discovered in the bedroom of
herapartmentafew days later. Stell had been bound, gagged, andstabbed
twice. Semen was found in her vagina and anus, and margarine was
smeared on her anal ring. Stell's apartment was in disarray, with the
contents of dresser drawers and two purses-including empty pill
containers- strewn upon the floor.1
Hoke confessed to the murder on three separate occasions. He
consistently denied rape, a predicate offense necessary to capital murder.
His story remained more or less the same: after meeting Stell at the
restaurant, he went to her apartment, where the two had consensual
vaginal and anal sex. The anal sex was Stell's idea. He then bound,
gagged, and stabbed her. Before fleeing, he decided to look around the
apartm nt for drugs, and upon finding prescription medication in her
purse, he stole some pills.2 The only major inconsistency in his confes-
sions concerned when he formed his intent to kill. In his third confession,
Hoke told police that he had decided to kill Stell before they arrived at her
apartment; in his other confessions and at trial, he stated that he "flew into
a rage when Stell slapped him over some sort of transgression." 3
In their investigation of the murder, the Petersburg police inter-
viewed numerous potential witnesses in both Stell's apartment building
and the European Restaurant. Louella Robinette, a patron of the restau-
rant, told police that she "saw Hoke and Stell hugging and kissing at the
restaurant, and the pair later left together." 4 The police further learned
that Stell was known to be sexually promiscuous. "Several witnesses
stated that Stell would 'go with anyone."5 "A few witnesses even named
names, which led the police to interview three men:" James Henry Jones,
Lowell Eastes, and Dale Griesert.6 Eastes admitted to having vaginal sex
with Stell on several occasions, the last time about three weeks before the
murder.7 Griesert stated that he and Stell had engaged in vaginal sex and
I Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1352-53 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 1d. at 1353.
3 Id. at 1365-66 (Hall, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1365 (Hall, J., dissenting).




9 Id. at 1366 (Hall, J., dissenting).
10Id. at 1353. Note that imprecision in the verdict can have
appellate significance. Even though either aggravating factor would be
sufficient to support a death sentence, it is important to know whether the
jury found one or both, and if only one, which one. See Clemons v.
Mississippi,494 U.S. 738 (1990); Stringer v.Black, 503 U.S 222 (1992).
For information as to how to frame these facts into an appellate issue,
please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
It Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1353.
12Id. at 1353-54.
13 Id. at 1368 (Hall, J., dissenting).
(on one occasion) anal sex, that the "anal sex had been at Stell's behest,
and that she had provided Vaseline as a lubricant."'8 Jones admitted to a
single sexual encounter with Stell.9
None of this information was turned over to Hoke prior to his trial.
On August 5, 1986, Hoke was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of robbery, rape, and abduction and sentenced to death
based upon, as reported by the court of appeals, the "future dangerous-
ness" or "vileness" aggravating factors. 10 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed Hoke's conviction and sentence, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 11 Hoke subsequently filed and was
denied a petition for state habeas relief, a second petition for certiorari,
and a second petition for state habeas relief.
12
Hoke then filed a federal habeas petition, which was originally
dismissed by the district court without an evidentiary hearing. "At this
point, Hoke still did not know about the suppressed witness state-
ments." 13 Upon a petition for reconsideration, the district court vacated
its earlier dismissal, and permitted Hoke to amend his petition to assert
an equal protection claim. 14 An evidentiary hearing was set for Novem-
ber 1994, and the district court ordered the Commonwealth to provide it
with the prosecution's file from the state court proceedings. The Com-
monwealth produced the Petersburg Police Department files, which
included the witness interviews with Jones, Eastes, Griesert, and
Robinette. 15
The revelations in the police file prompted Hoke to again amend his
federal habeas petition to claim that the prosecution had (1) knowingly
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,16 and
(2) knowingly used perjured testimony in violation ofNapue i. Illinois
17
when it presented the trial testimony of Hoke's fellow inmate, Emmet
Sallis. 18 The district courtgranted the writ, holding that (1) neitherof the
newly added claims was procedurally barred because the facts in support
of them were not known to Hoke; (2) even if the claims were defaulted,
the Brady claim could stand because Hoke could show cause and
prejudice, and theNapue claim could stand because it was tied to a claim
of actual innocence ofthe predicate crimes of robbery and abduction; and
14 Id. Hoke asserted that racial animus was at the root of the
Commonwealth Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty against
him. Id. See infra, Part II.B.2.
15 Id. at 1354.
16 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
17 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
18 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1354. "Sallis testified as follows:"
[Hoke] said he had a murder charge. And he said the charge
that it happened on Union Street and that he was living in
Maryland and he came down here on different occasions
because he knew the woman. He sold drugs to the woman or
somebody in that apartment complex. And he said that they
had went out that day and when he came back, because he was
supposed to sell some drugs to her and he found out that she had
ripped him off, so he found out he couldn't get his stuff back
so he killed her.
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(3) the Brady violation rendered invalid Hoke's predicate rape convic-
tion and the Napue violation rendered invalid both the predicate robbery
and abduction convictions. 19
The Commonwealth appealed the district court's order for a new
trial, arguing that none of Hoke's predicate offense convictions of rape,
robbery, and abduction (any one of which is sufficient to sustain Hoke's
capital murder conviction) was subject to constitutional challenge. 20
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the grant of relief, and reinstated Hoke's convictions and death sentence.
A majority of the panel held that: (1) the prosecution did not violate
Brady by failing to disclose the witness interviews because such infor-
mation was "reasonably available " to Hoke2 1 and not "material"
exculpatory evidence;2 2 and (2) the record did not support the finding




I. The Brady Claim
A. Brady Obligation is Independent of "Reasonable
Investigation" by Defense Counsel
In holding that the prosecution did not violateBrady by withholding
the statements of Jones, Eastes, and Griesert, the court of appeals stated,
The strictures of Brady are not violated, however, if the
information allegedly withheld by the prosecution was reason-
ably available to the defendant. As we held in United States v.
Wilson,24 "where the exculpatory information is not only
available to the defendant but also lies in a source where a
reasonable defendant would have looked, a defendant is not
entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine."'25 Here, there is
little doubt that had Hoke undertaken a "reasonable and
diligent" investigation, he wouldhave learned of Jones, Eastes,
Griesert, and their relationships with Stell.
26
19 1d. at 1359, 1354.
201d. at 1359.
21 Id. at 1355-56.
22 1d. at 1357.
23 Id. at 1365.
24901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1990).
25 Id. at 381.
26 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1355.
27See, e.g., Stockton v. Murray,41 F.3d 920,927 (4th Cir. 1994) and
case summary of Stockton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 10
(1995).
28See, e.g., UnitedStates v. White, 970 F.2d 328,337 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that there is no duty of disclosure when the information is "'fully
available' to the defense) (citations omitted); UnitedStates v. Perdomo,
929 F.2d 967, 973 (3rd Cir. 199 1) (finding a Brady violation based upon
the Government's failure to disclose the criminal records of its witness,
even though the Office of the Public Defender, which represented the
defendant, had previously represented the witness); United States v.
Todd, 920 F.2d 399,405 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that there is no Brady
violation when the defendant is made aware "of the essential facts that
would enable him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence");
United States v. Hicks, 848 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the
In making such a statement, the court of appeals quoted only itself
and one Eleventh Circuit case as authority for the proposition that Brady
does not require the prosecution to disclose evidence available to the
defendant from other sources, including diligent investigation by the
defense.
27
Eight of the Courts of Appeals (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and
11 th Circuits) have concluded that there exists, at least in name, a "due
diligence" exception to the State's obligation under the Due Process
Clause to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant. However, with
the exception of the Fourth Circuit, each has limited the exception to
cases in which the defense actually possessed the evidence, or at a
minimum, had all the information needed to obtain the evidence.28 The
District of Columbia and Tenth Circuit have explicitly rejected the idea
of any "due diligence" exception to the Brady's mandate.
29
Although the question whether the evidence was "reasonably
available" to the defendant may be relevant to the materiality of withheld
information, it is not relevant to the overall scope of the Brady doctrine.
The Brady doctrine is grounded in an affirmative obligation of the state
to afford the defendant a trial that comports with due process. The
prosecution thus cannot be relieved of its affirmative duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, though it can be saved from the
consequences of its breach by a hindsight determination that its breach
of duty does not "undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial." 30
Brady and its progeny thus stand for the proposition that when the
defense asks the prosecution whether the prosecution has any exculpa-
tory evidence, the prosecution must turn over such evidence, even if
reasonable defense counsel could find the evidence by other means.
Moreover, in United States v. Agurs,31 the Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose obviously exculpatory
evidence even without specific request by defense counsel. 32 In sum, the
Supreme Court has never stated that a defendant loses the benefits of
Brady if the information at issue could be obtained by the defendant
through reasonably diligent investigation.
33
The Fourth Circuit applied its same flawed reasoning to note that
Hoke's Brady claim was defaulted in any event pursuant to Virginia
Code § 8.01-654(B)(2). 34 According to the court, under section 801-
654(B)(2), a "petitioner is barred from raising any claim in a successive
petition if the facts as to that claim were either known 'or available' to the
petitioner at the time ofhis original petition. '35 Section 8.01-654(B)(2),
government has no Brady burden when evidence is readily available to
the defense); United States v. Esposito, 834 F.2d 272, 275-76 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding no Brady violation occurred where the defense actually
had the transcripts and failed to follow up on that information); United
States v. Davis, 785 F.2d 610, 618 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding no Brady
violation when information contained in a medical report was actually in
defendant's possession); United States v. Milstead, 671 F.2d 950, 953
(5th Cir. 1982) (finding no Brady violation because defense failed to
follow up on information that bank might have exculpatory statement).
29 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 436 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995).
30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
31 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
32 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. At the time the decision to disclose or
withhold is made, the prosecution will seldom know the state of defense
counsel's knowledge or investigation concerning the information.
33 To the contrary, the Court has reminded prosecutors that the pre-
trial decision to withhold evidence falling within the ambit of Brady is
made at their peril. Kyles v. Whitely, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567 (1995).
34 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1354, n. 1.
35 Id.
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however, reads that "[n]o writ shall be granted on the basis of any
allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of
filing any previous petition."'36 The statute does not provide that any
allegation the facts of which petitioner could have known will prevent
a writ from issuing. As it has done in other cases, the court read the "could
have known" requirement into the statute.
37
Defense counsel in Virginia should not accept the court's erroneous
interpretation of both the scope of Brady and the bounds of Va. Code §
8.01-654(B)(2). Attorneys should strenuously attempt to persuade trial
judges, state habeas judges, and federal district court judges that the
Fourth Circuit's doctrine is simply not the law. In any event, one may
hope that ifa proper record is made, the United States Supreme Court will
one day rule on the issue.
B. What Constitutes "Reasonable Investigation"?
Even those circuit courts which have relieved the prosecution of its
Brady obligation when the exculpatory information was in possession of
or readily available to the defense have not gone as far as the Fourth
Circuit. In describing the inadequacy of Hoke's investigation into Stell's
prior relationships and sexual history, the court of appeals stated that the
"entirety of the investigation entailed perhaps as few as two, and no more
than four, visits to the European Restaurant by Hoke's attorney, during
which he interviewed as few as five, and no more than seven, people."38
The court also stated that Hoke's attorney did not attempt to interview
Stell's neighbors and friends in her apartment complex, which, accord-
ing to the court, were "some of the first persons an attorney would
reasonably be expected to contact in a case such as this.' 39 The court
concluded thatbecause the police learned the names ofJones, Eastes, and
Griesert "from sources with whom Hoke's attorney spoke or from
persons 'readily accessible' to Hoke," Hoke could have learned of all
three of the men had he undertaken a "reasonable investigation." 40
However, as pointed out by Judge Hall in his dissent, Hoke's
attorney tried, but was precluded from conducting an investigation
comparable to that done by the police. As stated by Judge Hall, "[Hoke's
attorney] went to the European Restaurant to try to find out about Stell,
but was met with tight lips and outright hostility, including at least one
physical threat."4 1 The frustration on the part of Hoke's attorney is
evidenced by his response to the district court's questioning at the
evidentiary hearing as to why he did not do more: "'I would have
probably run out of names or run out of people other than just standing
at the European lunch... [A]t that point I didn't have anybody else other
than standing on the street comer asking.'
42
Further, in answering Hoke's discovery requests for exculpatory
evidence on either the issue of guilt or punishment, prosecutor Joseph
Preston stated falsely that the Commonwealth was unaware of any
exculpatory evidence other than Hoke's "'alleged drug problem.' 4 3 In
United States v. Bagley,4 the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[a]n
36 Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(2).
37 See Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995) and case
summary of Barnes, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 11 (1995);
Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1994), and case summary of
Stockton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 10 (1995).
38 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1355.
391Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1366 (Hall, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1355.
43 Id. at 1366 (Hall, J., dissenting).
44473 U.S. 667 (1985).
45 Id. at 682, 683.
46 1996 WL 496601 (4th Cir. Jul. 8, 1996). See case summary of
incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense
of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense
that the evidence does not exist," and indicated that defense counsel
could reasonably rely on such nondisclosure for "pretrial and trial
decisions on the basis of [the] assumption" that such evidences does not
exist.45 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, Hoke's attorney reason-
ably relied on the information given by prosecutor Preston, and whether
Hoke could have found the information at issue through "reasonably
diligent investigation" should have been irrelevant.
In Hoke's case, however, the court of appeals relied on its conclu-
sion that Hoke had not conducted a "reasonably diligent investigation,"
and applied its erroneous interpretation of Brady to deny its benefits to
Hoke, as well as its erroneous reading of Va. Code §8.01-654(B)(2) to
find the Brady claim defaulted. It is interesting to compare the court's
finding of "inadequate investigation" in Hoke to its treatment of what
constitutes "reasonable investigation" when assessing an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. For example, in Stout v. Netherland,4 6 the
Fourth Circuit held that the defendant did not receive ineffective assis-
tance of counsel despite the fact that his counsel failed to interview any
possible mitigation witnesses and to present any of the possible mitiga-
tion evidence which the district court had characterized as "'overwhelm-
ing.' 47 Similarly, in Turner v. Williams,4 8 the Fourth Circuit concluded
that although the defendant's attorney "'could have perhaps investigated
the facts of the case more thoroughly and with more diligence,' and
perhaps could have prepared more thoroughly for the resentencing
proceeding, [the defendant did] not show that [his attorney's] perfor-
mance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
'49
Thus, in terms of what constitutes a "reasonably diligent investiga-
tion," the Fourth Circuit has set the bar much higher for the evaluation of
an investigation under its erroneous interpretation of the strictures of
Brady than it requires for the evaluation of an investigation under an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.50
C. What Constitutes "Material"?
The court also found Hoke'sBrady claim to be meritless because the
statements of Jones, Eastes, and Griesert could not be considered
"material." In so holding, the court overturned the district court's finding
that the statements of Jones, Eastes, and Griesert were material because
they "'cast into serious doubt the Commonwealth's theory that the sexual
encounter between Stell and [Hoke] was non-consensual."' 5 1
According to United States v. Bagley, evidence is "material" "only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
'52
Furthermore, "[a] 'reasonable probability' of a different result is shown
when the Government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial." 53
Stout, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
47 Stout, 1996 WL 496601 at *9. The possible mitigating evidence
included the alcoholism of Stout's parents, different treatment as a
mixed-race child among whites, physical and sexual abuse, and forced
migrant labor. Ultimately, the district court stated that it could discern
"no conceivable advantage to counsel's approach" to sentencing. Id.
48 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994).
49 Id. at 897.
50 See case summary of Beaver v. Thompson, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue.
5 1 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1356.
52 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
53 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995) (citingBagley, 473
U.S at 678).
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In concluding that the statements of Eastes and Jones were not
"material," the court pointed to the fact that neither Eastes nor Jones
stated that they had engaged in anything but vaginal intercourse with
Stell. 54 The court was forced to concede that Griesert's account of his
anal sexual encounter with Stell was arguably more relevant; however,
the majority concluded that Griesert's statement was not "material"
given that Stell's body was bruised; that margarine was used instead of
a more common lubricant; and that Stell's body was found murdered,
bound, and gagged in the position in which she was sodomized.
55
In Kyles v. Whitely,56 the Supreme Court held that the materiality
of evidence must be considered collectively.57 Thus, although a court's
analysis of "materiality" is a matter upon which reasonable minds can
differ, a court must consider all of the available evidence in its assessment
of materiality. In Hoke, however, the majority made no mention of the
witness who told police that she had observed Hoke and Stell kissing and
hugging in the European Restaurant. As Judge Hall stated in dissent,
"Had the jury known of Stell's aggressive promiscuity, including evi-
dence of consensual anal sex, and that she had been seen 'hugging and
kissing' Hoke just before her death, it is at least 'reasonably probable'
that the result would have been different."
'58
II. The Napue Claim
A. Sawyer and Schiup: Two Different Standards for
"Actual Innocence"
Because Hoke did not raise his Napue claim that the prosecutor had
knowingly allowed Sallis to testify falsely at trial in his two previous state
petitions, the claim should have been procedurally defaulted. Neverthe-
less, the district court allowed Hoke to raise the claim in his federal
habeas petition because it concluded that the error went to a claim of
"actual innocence" of the predicate crimes of robbery and abduction. To
reach this conclusion, "the district court reasoned that Sallis testified
falsely (and the prosecution had knowingly suborned that perjury in
violation of Napue) and that absent Sallis' testimony, which would not
have been introduced absent such constitutional error, no reasonable
juror could have concluded that Hoke was guilty of murder in the
commission of robbery or abduction."59
With regard to its finding of "actual innocence," the district court
cited both Sawyer v. Whitely60 and Schlup v. Delo6 1 as support for the
proposition that in order to qualify for the "actual innocence" exception
to the procedural bar, "a petitioner must show by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find
him eligible for the death penalty under [state law]."'62 This is the
Sawyer test. The Sawyer standard was created for cases in which the
petitioner claimed he was "actually innocent of the death penalty," and
should thus be applied to those factors prescribed by state law which
54 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1357.
55 Id. at 1357-58.
56 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
57 1d. at 1567.
58 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1369 (Hall, J., dissenting).
59 1d. at 1359.
60505 U.S. 333 (1992). See also case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
6 1 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). See also case summary of Schlup, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 4 (1995).
62 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty. Under Virginia law, then,
the Sawyer standard is applicable to the aggravating factors that must be
found by the jury in order to impose a death sentence: "future dangerous-
ness" and "vileness."
Schlup, on the other hand, allows a court to hear a successive or
abusive habeas petition on the merits-when the petitioner cannot
establish cause and prejudice-if a petitioner can show that a constitu-
tional violation has "'probably' resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent. ' 63 Thus, this lower "more likely than not" standard
is reserved for those defendants who claim to be innocent of the crime.
In Virginia cases, the Schlup standard is arguably applicable to what
jurors would have found about the petitioner's innocence or guilt of the
crime-i.e., the elements of the crime of capital murder.
In assessing whether Hoke was procedurally barred from raising his
Napue claim, both the district court and the court of appeals erred,
arguably, in applying the higher Sawyer standard to their evaluation of
whether Hoke was actually innocent of the predicate crimes of robbery
and abduction. The applicable standard where elements of a predicate
"crime" beyond murder could also be viewed as "death eligibility"
elements is an open question that has not yet been addressed by the
United States Supreme Court. It is an important issue which appears to
have been completely overlooked in Hoke. Obviously, habeas attorneys
in Virginia should not accept the Fourth Circuit's assumption that
Sawyer applies but should instead maintain that (1) the Sawyer standard
is applicable only to the evaluation of whether, absent constitutional
error, a reasonable juror would have found "future dangerousness" or
"vileness," and (2) the Schlup standard is applicable to the evaluation of
whether, absent constitutional error, a reasonable juror would have found
the defendant guilty of the elements of capital murder. 64
B. The Record Not Considered by the Majority
1. Different Conclusions on Different Evidence
In evaluating Hoke's habeas petition, the district court concluded
that Sallis had presented perjured testimony at Hoke's trial, and that
absent Sallis's testimony, Hoke's predicate robbery and abduction
charges were unsupported by the evidence. The Fourth Circuit flatly
disagreed, and the dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority. In the
face of such disagreement, it is interesting to note that the majority and
the dissent in Hoke seem to have read two different records.
In arguing that Sallis, Hoke's cellmate, offered perjured testimony
about his conversation with Hoke,65 the dissent pointed out that just a
week prior to his testimony, Sallis had been sentenced to "17 1/2 years
in prison on numerous forgery, uttering, and petit larceny charges, all but
five of which were suspended on the condition that he continue to
cooperate with law enforcement authorities. 66 As Judge Hall stated
63 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (emphasis added).
64 Whether a Sawyer claim remains viable under the Anti-Terror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is an unsettled question. See
Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus under the
Anti-Terrorism andEffectiieDeath PenaltyAct of1996, Capital Defense
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52; Eade, The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Part
II: Habeas Corpus under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
65 See infra, n. 18.
66 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1367 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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in dissent, "It is obvious that this 'cooperation' meant assistance to [the
prosecutor] in Hoke's case."'67 Furthermore, after he pleaded guilty but
prior to his sentencing, Sallis was released on a reduced bond, even
though he was facing a lengthy prison term and had recently failed to
appear on an unrelated grand larceny charge. Finally, during cross-
examination, Sallis "grossly understated his criminal history" and "flatly
denied that the Commonwealth had offered him 'any deals' or 'time
cuts.' 68
The majority, on the other hand, stated that the district court's
conclusion that Sallis perjured himself when he testified as to his
conversation with Hoke "is simply without any support in the record."
'69
In reaching its conclusion, the majority pointed to the following, among
other things: (I) Sallis never recanted his testimony; (2) Hoke never
suggested that he did not have a conversation with Sallis like the one
represented by Sallis; (3) Hoke's attorney urged the jury in closing
argument to credit a portion of Sallis's testimony, arguing it tended to
prove that no robbery had occurred; and (4) Sallis's understatement of his
criminal history was attributable to misunderstanding on his part or
inartful questioning by defense counsel. 70 The majority made no men-
tion of the deal Sallis made with the prosecution or of his subsequent
denial of such a deal during his testimony.
With regard to the robbery predicate, the district court conceded that
pills were taken after Stell's murder and detention, and that Hoke
confessed to taking them, but concluded that "absent Sallis's testimony,
there was no evidence from which ajuror could conclude that Hoke had
murdered Stell in the commission of a robbery.'"7 1 The majority flatly
disagreed with this conclusion, observing that the evidence established
that "Hoke was a drug user, that he had only three dollars in his pocket
when he killed Stell, that after killing Stell he ransacked her apartment,
and that after ransacking her apartment he stole pills out of her purse."
'72
Finally, with regard to the abduction predicate, the district court
concluded that absent Sallis's testimony, there was a dearth of evidence
to support Hoke's abduction conviction, as there was a "'lack of any
evidence demonstrating an intent to extort money or pecuniary gain.' 
73
The majority disagreed, stating that a reasonable juror could conclude
that Hoke abducted Stell with the intent to steal drugs, money, or both
from Stell from the testimony that Hoke was a drug user, that he had only
about three dollars in his pocket when he murdered Stell, that he bound
and gagged Stell, and that he ransacked her apartment in search of
drugs.
74
67 Id. Although there was no evidence in this case that Sallis was
a "paid informant" such that his conduct implicated the protections of
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269-75 (1980) (holding that
defendant's incriminating statements made to paid informant who, while
confined to same cellblock as defendant, had been told by government
agents to be alert to any statements made by federal prisoners but not to
initiate conversations with or question defendant regarding the charges
against him were inadmissible as being "deliberately elicited" from
defendant in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel), a
potential Henry claim should be investigated whenever there is a snitch.
Please contact the Virginia Capital Clearinghouse should you need more
information concerning the admissibility of "jailhouse snitch" testi-
mony, including tactics designed to protect against snitches in the first
instance.
68 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1367 (Hall, J., dissenting).
69Id. at 1360.
701d. at 1360-61.
71 Id. at 1362-63. Va. Code § 18.2-31(4) provides that "the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of
Thus, not only did the majority and dissent reach different conclu-
sions in Hoke, they also considered different records. Quite clearly, the
majority did not consider the entire record.
2. Unprofessional Conduct of the Prosecutor
Also not addressed by the majority was that part of the record
revealing uncontradicted evidence of professional misconduct on the
part of the prosecuting attorney. In dissent, Judge Hall began his opinion
by stating:
[T~his case has two villains. The first, of course, is appellee
Ronald Hoke, who committed a brutal murder and deserves a
fitting punishment. The othervillain,prosecutorJoseph Preston,
left no legal or ethical comer uncut in his pursuit of Hoke's
conviction and death sentence.
75
Preston withheld the witness statements of Jones, Eastes, Griesert,
and Robinette from the defense. Even if Preston was not constitutionally
required to disclose such statements under the Brady materiality inquiry,
he was nonetheless required to disclose them, without regard to their
"materiality," under DR 8-102(A)(4) of the Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which states, in relevant part:
A public prosecutor... in criminal litigation shall make timely
disclosure to counsel for the defendant ... of the existence of
evidence, known to the prosecutor... that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or
reduce the punishment.
Furthermore, according to DR 7-102 (A)(3), "a lawyer shall not...
conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to
reveal." According to Lemons v. Commonwealth,7 6 "a prosecutor does
not meet his orher ethical duty simply by making a pretrial determination
that the information if disclosed, would not likely change the outcome of
the trial."'77 Rather, "if in doubt about the exculpatory nature of the
material, a prosecutor should submit it to the trial court for an in camera
review to determine if it is exculpatory and should be disclosed."
'78
a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon" constitutes capital murder.
The Virginia courts have interpreted § 18.2-31(4) to include motive as an
element of the crime. Thus, in order to be found guilty of capital murder
in the commission of a robbery, one of the defendant's motives must have
been the taking of property. See Whitely v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66,
73; 286 S.E.2d 162, 166 (1982) (holding "the fact that the larceny did not
occur until after [the defendant] had killed his victim [did] not prove that
his decision to steal was an afterthought. And the jury logically could
conclude that... both sex and the robbery motivated his conduct").
72 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1363.
73 1d. at 1364.
74Id.
75 Id. at 1365 (Hall, J., dissenting).
76 18 Va. App. 617,446 S.E.2d 158 (1994).
77 d. at 621,446 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting Humes v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 1140, 1144 n. 2,408 S.E.2d 553, 555 n. 2 (1991)).
78 Id. See also Kyles v. Whitely, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
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Second, whether Sallis's testimony regarding his alleged conversa-
tion with Hoke was perjured or not, the record demonstrates that Sallis's
denial of "any deals" or "time cuts" was false testimony, and Preston had
an ethical obligation to correct such testimony pursuant to DR 7-
102(A)(4) and (6) as well as DR 7-105(C)(6). 79 Moreover, according to
Alcorta v. Texas,80 a defendant is denied due process of law when a
witness testifies falsely to the knowledge of the prosecutor. 81
Third, through calls to the expert's receptionist, Preston obtained a
copy of the report drafted by Hoke's psychiatric expert, which is
protected by the attorney-client privilege until and unless the defense
gives notice of an intent to rely on insanity or mitigating psychological
evidence.82 Preston also later interviewed the psychiatrist. As the dissent
pointed out, Preston's actions probably violated both the rule of Ake v.
Oklahoma 83 as well as state law.
84
Perhaps most disturbing, however, was the racial animus Preston
exhibited toward Hoke. Hoke, who is white, was originally charged with
first-degree, but not capital, murder. As described by the dissent, the
original prosecutor, Raymond Lupold, (who is also white) "took a look
at the results of the investigation-a mentally unstable, 85 intoxicated
defendant and a victim of limited repute-and decided he 'didn't have
much of an opportunity to seek the death penalty at that stage."'86
However, after Lupold was voted out of office and Joseph Preston (who
is black) took over the Hoke case, Hoke was charged with capital murder.
Hoke's attorney attempted to plea bargain with Preston, but his offer of
a life sentence in return for a guilty plea was refused. Though Preston
79 DR 7-102(A)(4) states, "a lawyer shall not... knowingly use
perjured testimony or false evidence."
DR 7-102(A)(6) states, "a lawyer shall not.. . participate in the
creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that
the evidence is false.
DR 7-105(C)(6) states, "in appearing in his professional capacity
before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not.., knowingly offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures."
80 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
81 Id. at 31.
82 Va. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(D).
83470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that indigent defendant with possible
insanity defense is entitled to state-paid psychiatrist to assist in his
defense).
84 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1367-68 (Hall, J., dissenting).
85 The day of the murder, Hoke was released from a mental hospital,
where he had been treated as a voluntary patient for nearly a week for
denied it, the district court found as a fact, and the Fourth Circuit did not
disturb the finding, that Preston told Hoke's attorney that he "'wanted to
be the first black man to put a white man in Ihe electric chair.' 87 Aside
from being a comment unbecoming of a lawyer, such behavior is
violative of EC 8-10.88 In commenting on Preston's behavior, Judge Hall
stated in his dissent
[T]he sins of the white race will not be purged by offering up
Ronald Hoke as a sacrifice to a vengeful black prosecutor. I
dare-say that if the races of Preston and Hoke were reversed,
no court in the land would excuse Preston's racist statement as
"posturing" or "mere talk." It is unconstitutional, despicable
talk, and if for nothing else, the writ should issue on Hoke's
equal protection claim.
89
Ronald Hoke was executed. Whatever else may be done to combat
misconduct as part of the trial process, it is not only an option but an
ethical responsibility of an attorney to report such extreme instances of
unprofessional conduct to the bar.90 A complaint against Joseph Preston
has been filed.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
mental problems stemming from extreme drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at
1365 (Hall, J., dissenting).
86 1d. at 1366 (Hall, J., dissenting).
871d. (emphasis in original). At the evidentiary hearing on the equal
protection claim in the district court, Preston "admitted making race-
based appeals for support in election campaigns," but he denied making
the statement about being the first black man to put a white man in the
electric chair. Id. at 1368 (Hall, J., dissenting).
88 EC 8-10 states, in relevant part, "The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
ierely to convict."
89 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1370 (Hall, J., dissenting).
90 See DR 1-103(A), which states, in relevant part, "A lawyer
having information indicating that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Disciplinary Rules that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law in other
respects, shall report such information to the appropriate professional
authority."
